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Review Essay

MARX AND MORALITY: AN IMPOSSIBLE SYNTHESIS?

A discussion of Allen E. Buchanan, Marx and Justice (Totowa: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1982); Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., Marx. Justice. and History (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1980); and Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten, eds., Marx and Morality,
Supplementary Volume VII of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy
(Guelph: Canadian Association for PubJishing in Philosophy, 198 J).

HARRY VAN DER LINDEN

Can the case for socialism be based on a specific set of values and does this
constitute a remedy for bureaucratic communism or does it Jead to elitism
and even repression? Did Marx believe that wage-labor is unjust or was it his
view that any concern with economic justice is a typical bourgeois preoccupation? And. finally, should the appeal to vaJues playa role in revolutionary
motivation? These are some of the more important questions raised and
discussed in the above publications, which are concerned with the normative
aspects of Marx's thought.

Evaluative Perspective
Marx appraised the emergence of the communist society as progress rather
than as mere change. Throughout his work he both investigated capitaJist
society and condemned it. These value judgments are launched from different perspectives in his early and later works. In the early writings (notably,
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts), Marx unfolds a conception
of human nature that functions as his evaluative perspective. He singles out
certain human capacities as truJy human, denouncing capitalism as inhuman
because it causes man's alienation from these capacities. In the communist
society this alienation is overcome, thus making it superior to the capitalist
society. Such an attempt to ground normative judgments in a conception of
human nature is characteristic of humanistic socialism, whereas it is, of
course, repudiated by scientific socialism.
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Douglas Kellner's" Marxism, Morality, and Ideology" (Marx and Morality)
reflects the humanistic viewpoint despite his claim that each of the two
Marxisms distorts the orginal M,arxian enterprise ("integral Marxism").
Kellner argues that socialist values express radical human needs and are to be
grounded in a theory of human nature that is materialist, social, and historical. He stresses that these values must guide the construction of socialism,
contrasting his viewpoint with scientific socialism which bases moral and
political action on the laws of history with the result that "it tends toward
elitism and support for party-dictatorship in which the working class is
ordered to submit to the directives of those who allegedly know the laws of
history (i.e., the party leadership)" (120).
The opposing viewpoint can be found in Andrew Collier's "Scientific Socialism and the Question of Socialist Values" (Marx and Morality). He assails
"theoretical humanism" for its disregard of the objective conditions required
for the revolution and socialism, and maintains that as such humanism has a
profound affinity with Stalinism, as exemplified in "Stalin's voluntaristic
contempt for objective laws at the time of industrialization, expressed in the
slogan 'there are no fortresses that Communists cannot storm'" (131). This
is not a very telling objection because it is not necessary that this voluntarism
be imbedded in humanistic socialism. But Collier's major and more interesting criticisms are directed against humanism as an axiology and, in general,
against the attempt to base the case for socialism on a specific set of values.
Collier offers two arguments against interpreting socialism as a value system.
The first rests upon the premise that "any political movement whose motivation lies outside the needs, desires, sufferings and aspirations of the majority
of its contemporaries can only lead, if successful, to the imposition of the
ideals of an elite on a reluctant people" (148). Thus Collier maintains that the
danger inherent in any ethical socialism is that those who fail or refuse to
realize truly human capacities will be repressed. Examples given are Gorky's
defense of prison sentences for homosexuals (re-introduced by Stalin) in the
name of "proletarian hum~nism" (131) and the Khmer Rouge leaders' claim
that in the revolution the "rotten fruit," i.e., corrupt people, must be eliminated because the condition for socialism is a population of uncorrupted
individuals (127). Here Collier responds to E. P. Thompson's suggestion
that anti-humanist ideas may have had some impact on the Khmer Rouge's
bloody "experiment." Collier says that Marx left this "humanistic danger"
behind at the time that he wrote The German Ideology, for "from that time
on, Marx does not appeal to a particular privileged subset of human motives,
nor does he appeal to an unrealized ideal of human excellence: he relies, for
the motivating force of his ideas, on desires that existing individuals already
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have" (132). In Althusserian fashion, Collier calls this change in Marx's work
an "axiological break" and cites the following well-known passage from The
German Ideology to support his case (140): "Communism is for us not ... an
ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself [but] the real movement
which abolishes the present state of things [and] result[s] from the now
existing premise."
Collier's second argument is that the effort to construct a specific set of
socialist values is futile. He briefly discusses equality, freedom, and collectivism (as opposed to individualism), denies that any interpretation of these
values is specifically socialist, and infers that there is no set of socialist values.
Moreover, he substantiates his argument with the claim that "there is an
extremely wide spectrum of axiological standpoints which, combined with a
Marxist analysis of the workings of capitalism, would compel their adherents to adopt socialist politics" (146). Collier concludes that the worthwhile
task is not searching for socialist values, but carrying out scientific investigation of capitalism (and other social formations). Obviously, he thinks that
Marx, in his time, came to the same conclusion.
This essay fails both as a criticism of humanist (and ethical) socialism and as
an interpretation of Marx. Collier's thesis that Marx's writings "after the
axiological break" demand "a democratic respect for the existing aspirations
of the workers" (140) is hard to reconcile either with Marx's own role in the
workers' movement, or with his political writings. For instance, it conflicts
with Marx's overly severe attack on the self-taught worker Wilhelm Weitling
and with his criticism of the Proudhonists in the First International, who
enjoyed working-class support.] Perhaps Collier would reply that criticism
and respect are not mutually exclusive, but this reply, although sensible in
itself, would not vindicate Marx in all respects and would undermine the
position that humanistic and ethical socialists, when they construct and
argue for their own value systems, violate the demand for respect for the
aspirations of the working class. A second and more important objection
involves Collier's interpretation of the evaluative perspective in Marx's
middle and late writings. This interpretation suggests that no specific evaluative perspective is present and that Marx's indictment of capitalism appeals
to a large variety of axiological standpoints.
A similar viewpoint is developed by Allen Wood in "The Marxian Critique
of Justice" (Marx. Justice. and History). He holds that Marx's condemnation of capitalism is based on a set of quite unexceptional values that require
no defense and, in agreement with Collier states that "no one has ever denied
that capitalism, understood as Marx's theory understands it, is a system of
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unnecessary servitude, replete with irrationalities and ripe for destruction"
(41). It is beyond doubt that capitalism will be denounced from a variety of
axiological standpoints (or from a set of noncontroversial values), if shown
to cause such evils as servitude, waste, hunger and death. This, however, does
not sustain the viewpoint of Collier and Wood, since it is equally certain that
condemnation admits of degree. Thus one might accept major aspects of
Marx's analysis of capitalism and denounce capitalism, without sharing his
radical indictment of it, because one may not share his belief that the evils in
question can be completely eliminated under any system. It is from this
perspective that Buchanan's response to Wood in Marx and Justice is to be
understood: "because Marx is neither a reformist nor a meliorist, but a
radical, his indictments of capitalism are implicitly comparative and the
standard of comparison is external to capitalism: the hunger, death, exhaustion, and loneliness of capitalism are seen to be avoidable - and hence
irrational- only [my emphasis] by reference to communism" (26). In other
words, without the communist society as the evaluative perspective in
Marx's middle and late writings (to which Buchanan is referring), Marx's
criticisms lose their radical character. Yet in order to decisively refute Collier
and Wood it remains to be shown that this perspective implies a commitment
on Marx's side to a distinct set of values.
Buchanan argues that in The German Ideology Marx withdrew the evaluative concept of human nature and employed instead a descriptive-explanatory concept anchored in the materialist theory of history. Then what is
distinctive about human beings is that they change themselves, their consciousness, their needs, and their social relations by changing the mode of
production. Further, Marx believed that the history of mankind is a history
of defective modes of production and that as a result all societies have
displayed distorted need patterns and impoverished human relations. (Considering the famous preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy, a defective mode of production might be defined as a mode in
which antagonistic production relations sooner or later fetter the development of the production forces.) Buchanan comments: "It appears, then, that
Marx may have held the very strong thesis that all serious interpersonal
conflicts are artifacts of defective modes of production or of the distorted
consciousness which defective modes of production engender" (33).
That Marx indeed held this thesis is clear from his brief descriptions of the
transition from capitalism to communism. The essential factors in this
transition are the socialization of the means of production, the elimination of
the division of labor, and the rapid growth of the production forces. The first
factor is fundamental for the initial stage of communism (later often called
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"socialism"), whereas the other two are crucial for the higher stage of
communism (later simply called "communism"). It is, then, the communist
mode of production that enables the communist society to inscribe on its
banner the classic slogan of Louis Blanc: "From each according to his
abilities, to each according to his needs." Buchanan correctly interprets this
not as a principle of justice (with the function of prescribing how conflicting
claims are to be adjudicated) - he argues that Marx thought that such
principles would not be required under communism - but as a principle that
succinctly describes the communist society: under the communist mode of
production human needs will no longer be distorted and undistorted needs
will be satisfied.
The satisfaction of undistorted needs makes communism superior to capitalism. This aspect of communism's superiority is, however, only one aspect of
Marx's view. For the fulfillment of needs not to lead to serious interpersonal
conflicts, their content must be taken into account. Buchanan observes that
Marx assumed the undistorted needs would turn out to be the very same
truly human capacities that he had identified in his early writings and that
Marx thought that this would prevent conflicts of social coordination.
Certainly Marx's brief sketches of the communist society substantiate these
observations and refute the Collier / Wood thesis that Marx criticized capitalism from a set of noncontroversial values.
It should now be evident that the passage from The German Ideology Collier

quotes to support his claim of an axiological break in Marx does not confirm
Marx's rejection of a specific set of values as his source of inspiration. Rather
it reflects Marx's conviction that the proletariat in virtue of its needs, misery,
and oppression would bring about the collapse of capitalism and that the
change in the mode of production would ensure adherence to the communist
values embedded in his evaluative concept of human nature. Consequently,
the difference between the early writings and the later work is not an
axiological break, but the development of a transition theory, the materialist
conception of history as applied to the collapse of capitalism and the emergence of communism. Buchanan objects that this Marxian schema uncritically pressupposes that the maximization of satisfaction and the fulfillment
of truly human desires will converge in the communist society. He also says
that even if one accepts Marx's claim that the socialization of the means of
production and the ensuing development of the production forces will bring
about undistorted preference-structures, it is not at all clear that these
preferences will coincide with the values that Marx assigns to future communist individuals. This gap in Marx's argument could befilled by a normative
theory powerful enough to show that informed and rational agents will
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choose these values, but with good reason Buchanan observes that "Marx
nowhere offers such a theory of practical rationality, and even if he had
rehabilitated his early normative concept of human nature, that concept is
not adequate to the task" (34). Marx's radical indictment of capitalism, then,
would be stronger were it grounded on an adequate socialist theory of value.
Moreover, a socialist axiology is important to guide the construction of the
socialist (or communist) society, as Kellner rightly argues, and can function
as a platform from which to condemn bureaucratic communism and social
"experiments" as undertaken by the Khmer Rouge.
Collier's arguments against the desirability and even possibility of a socialist
axiology can be refuted on rather formal grounds. The argument that links
socialist axiologies and repression fails to see the possibility that humanist
and ethical socialists adhere to axiologies that exclude repression for the sake
of the socialist (or communist) ideal. Yet certainly, this has been the case
historically. Further, Collier's argument that there is no list of socialist values
ignores the fact that even if it is correct that there are no values that are
specifically socialist, it does not follow that there is not a set of values (and
their lexical ordering) that is specifically socialist (the fallacy of composition). Finally, contra Buchanan, although the communist society is Marx's
ultimate evaluative perspective, Marx may also have condemned capitalism
from the perspective of the intermediate socialist society.
Exploitation and Economic Justice

Marx frequently charges that the proletariat is exploited under capitalism.
With this everyone can agree. What has stirred much controversy, however,
is whether Marx saw exploitation as a form of economic injustice. In his
"The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation" (Marx,
Justice, and History), G. A. Cohen, while agreeing that Marx saw exploitation as unjust, criticizes Marxists who believe that the labor theory of
(surplus) value is needed to expose economic injustice under capitalism.
Cohen thinks that Marl1 is to be counted among those Marxists and maintains that their argument for the charge of exploitation runs as follows (139):
(I) Labor and labor only creates value. (2) The laborer receives the value of
his labor power. (3) The value of the product (created by the laborer) is
greater than the value of his labor power. Therefore, (4) the laborer receives
less value than he creates. (5) The capitalist receives the remaining value.
Therefore, (6) the laborer is exploited by the capitalist. Cohen calls this
argument the "Traditional Marxian Argument," pointing out that premise
(I) comes from the labor theory of value, while the labor theory of surplus
value yields premises (2), (3), and (5). In addition, Cohen says that to speak of
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"the laborer" and "the capitalist" is to individualize the class relationship but
that this is merely done in imitation of Capitafs practice. He also remarks
that he wishes to sidestep the problem of identifying the working and
capitalist classes, as he is confident a solution can be found that preserves the
application of the Traditional Argument even for our time (140). But Cohen
need not deal with this problem. All that matters for the Traditional Argument is that capital ownership by itself brings value to its possessor and that
this value is created by the laborer. The problem of identifying capital
ownership (or lack thereof) with certain empirical classes - no matter how
important for other purposes - is not crucial for the Traditional Argument.
Cohen begins his attack on the Traditional Marxian Argument with the
claim that the labor theory of surplus value is irrelevant for the charge of
exploitation. Premises (2), (3) and (5) can be replaced by the simple (and
undoubtedly true) premise (7), which says that the capitalist receives some of
the value of the product. From (I) and (7) Cohen infers that the laborer
receives less value than he creates and that the capitalist receives some ofthe
value the laborer creates. It follows that the laborer is exploited. Cohen calls
the newly constructed argument the "Simpler Marxian Argument." The
price paid for this simplification is a loss of explanatory power, but Cohen
thinks that this is irrelevant when the concern is the charge of exploitation,
remarking that "it does not matter what explains the difference between the
value the worker produces and the value he receives; what matters is just that
there is that difference" (141).
Cohen next turns to the labor theory of value, which is supposed to yield
premise (I), and argues that a strict interpretation of this theory proves that
this premise is false. The strict doctrine claims that the value of a commodity
is determined by the currently socially necessary labor time to produce it.
"Currently" refers here to the moment the product enters the market, and it
can be readily seen that the omission of this term makes the labor theory of
value untenable. For suppose that at this moment a certain commodity
enters the market which was made five years ago in a labor time twice as long
as it takes now to produce it, then it is plainly wrong that its value is
determined by the labor time it took to produce it rather than by the labor
time that is currently socially necessary. In general, the value of a product is
not determined by the actual labor time invested in it, but by the labor time
that is socially required at the moment that the commodity enters the market.
Technological innovation and increasing efficiency can explain possible
differences between these two labor times. It follows, then, that it is false that
labor and labor only creates value (premise 1), if the strict labor theory of
value is true. For if labor creates value, then past labor creates value and
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determines the value of the product, which contradicts the strict doctrine.
Cohen shows that Marx sometimes confused premise (I), the "popular
doctrine" of the labor theory of value, with the strict doctrine, and proposes
that (I) is to be replaced by the truism that the laborer is the only person who
creates the product, that which has value (premise 8). The difference between
(I), the workers create value, and (8), they create what has value, is a subtle
one. Cohen says that Marxists confuse the two, while as a matter of fact they
are really motivated by the latter premise in their criticism of capitalism: the
workers live in poverty amid the riches they have created. The premise
change leads to the "Plain Argument" in which the charge of exploitation is
no longer based on the labor theory of (surplus) value (153): (8) The laborer is
the only person who creates the product, that which has value. (7) The
capitalist receives some of the value ofthe product. Therefore, (9) the laborer
receives less value than the value of what he creates, and (10) the capitalist
receives some of the value of what the laborer creates. Therefore, (6) the
laborer is exploited by the capitalist.
Cohen's essay presents a challenge to those Marxists who believe that the
main purpose of the labor theory of (surplus) value is to expose economic
injustice within capitalism. The underlying assumption is that Marx defined
exploitation as unjustly appropriating that which belongs to the worker - his
product or its value. It is noteworthy that this assumption is also made by
such vehement opponents of Marxism as Milton Friedman and Robert
N ozick. The latter comments on Marx's thesis that the rate of surplus value
equals the rate of exploitation: "the charm and simplicity of [Marx's] ... definition of exploitation is lost when it is realized that according to the
definition there will be exploitation in any society in which investment takes
place for a greater future product ... and in any society in which those
unable to work ... are subsidized by the labor of others."2 This absurd
consequence indicates that Marx did not define exploitation as unjust appropriation. Moreover, in Critique of the Gotha Programme, as Buchanan
points out (45), Marx criticized the authors of the Programme for committing the very error whi<;h Nozick attributes to him. The authors equated the
reasonable demand for an end to exploitation with the unreasonable demand
that the workers receive the "undiminished proceeds" oftheir labor. Marx, to
the contrary, argued that in the intermediate socialist society portions from
the total product are to be deducted for such things as the expansion of the
means of production, schools, health services and insurance funds. It is only
after these deductions. that the remainder of the total product is to be
distributed according to the amount of labor that each person has invested.
One difficulty with this socialist principle of economic justice (or "rights"
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principle, each individual has a right to get from society what he has given itafter ded uctions), is that it remains unclear how the amount of labor is to be
measured. Marx mentions the factors of duration and intensity, which
remind one of the well-known problems of measuring utility. Another
difficulty is that Marx does not argue for this principle. Its basis seems to be
some kind of Lockean labor theory of property and, interestingly enough, a
similar theory seems to underlie Cohen's Plain Argument. A final problem is
put forward by Marx himself: any principle of justice (or rights principle)
suffers from the defect that an equal standard is applied to individuals with
different needs, with the result that inequality occurs. Further, Marx attacked the authors of the Programme for being overly concerned with just
distribution rather than with the conditions of production. (And, notice,
after all Marx said that the socialist society and, hence, its principle of justice,
is "still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society.") Marx argued that
this bourgeois preoccupation with justice (and rights) would be overcome
under communism, for he was convinced that the abundance of economic
goods and the undistorted needs of communists would bring the communist
society beyond the narrow horizon of "bourgeois" justice (and rights). It is
from this perspective that Buchanan's previously mentioned contention that
communist society is beyond justice is to be understood. Moreover, it
clarifies his thesis that the slogan "From each according to his abilities, to
each according to his needs" is not a principle of distributive justice.
An alternative interpretation of Marx's conception of exploitation as well as
of the function of his labor theory of (surplus) value is required. For Marx,
the worker is exploited because the capitalist's ownership of the means of
production compels the worker either to enter the wage contract or to face
unemployment and even the threat of starvation. Another aspect of exploitation is that the capitalist controls the commodities produced by the workers
as well as the work activity itself, leading to alienation. Further, since the
worker's product is appropriated by the capitalist and has a value greater
than the wage paid (unpaid labor equals surplus value), an accumulation of
capital takes place, which, in turn, results in further control over the worker.
The main purpose of the labor theory of (surplus) value, then, is to reveal that
the "free" exchange of labor power and wage between the worker and the
capitalist leads to the domination of the worker. The thesis that the rate of
surplus value equals the rate of exploitation thus equates the rate of surplus
value with the rate of servitude. The worker could freely spend his miserable
wage within the private contours of the family, but even here (said Marx) the
spirit of exploitation led to prostitution and child labor.
The foregoing does not rule out that Marx also thought that exploitation is
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unjust or that the labor theory of value may be used to expose economic
injustice. In "Marx on Distributive Justice" (Marx. Justice and History),
Ziyad I. Husami states: "under capitalism, the producer is treated unjustly
because his reward is not proportional to the labor he supplies [as in the
intermediate socialist society, my addition] but, at best, to the value of his
labor power(a lesser quantity)" (59). And one might add that the workers are
unjustly treated because the deductions under capitalism foremost benefit
the capitalists rather than the workers. Yet clearly the labor theory of value is
barely needed to make these observations. This is not surprising if I am
correct that the major function of this theory is to reveal the mechanisms of
servitude rather than to unmask unjust distribution. Marx's use of words
such as "robbery," "embezzlement," and "theft" in reference to exploitation
show that he indeed believed that exploitation is also unjust. For Marx, then,
exploitation encompasses economic injustice but is in its essence a form of
servitude. With good reason Eugene Kamenka opens The Ethical Foundations of Marxism with the statement that Marx "came to Communism in the
interests of freedom, not of security." In conclusion, Cohen's analysis might
refute the view of some Marxists, but not that of Marx. 3

In "A Reply to Husami" (Marx. Justice and History) and in his essay cited
above, Wood likewise argues that Marx saw wage-labor as an instance of
servitude. However, he denies that Marx considered it to be unjust. Wood's
analysis starts with Marx's claim that the content oftransactions (such as the
one between worker and capitalist) "is just whenever it corresponds, is
appropriate, to the mode of production; it is unjust whenever it contradicts
that mode" (Capital III: 340). 4 Wood interprets this as saying that every
mode of production ought to be evaluated according to its appropriate
standard of justice. That is, he is not simply arguing that Marx made the
sociological observation that every mode of production has a corresponding
dominant principle of justice (to paraphrase Marx, the ruling conception of
justice is the conception ofthe ruling class), but that Marx thought that "the
only rational basis for applying any standard of justice to a transaction or
institution is the conformity of this standard to the mode of production
within which the transaction or institution is to be found" (108-9). Consequently, Wood argues that since wage-labor is appropriate to the capitalist
mode of production, Marx believed that it would be wrong to claim that
wage-labor is unjust or violates the rights of the worker. The following
passage (Capital I: 234-5) seems to support Wood's contention:
The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working-day as
long as possible ... and the labourer maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce
the working-day to one of definite normal duration. There is here, therefore, an antinomy,
right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal
rights force decides.
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Moreover, Marx said (Capital I: 194) that the creation and appropriation of
surplus value is "a piece of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injury
[Unrecht, injustice] to the seller" (the laborer).
Wood's thesis that Marx considered wage-labor just has drawn several
replies. Buchanan criticizes Wood for not distinguishing between what he
calls Marx's internal and external criticisms of capitalism (54 ff.). The former
is a criticism in terms of the capitalist notion of justice, whereas the latter is a
criticism from the perspective of the communist society. Buchanan says that
according to the internal criticism the exchange between wage-laborer and
capitalist is unjust because it is a forced exchange, thereby violating the
capitalist standard of just transactions as afree exchange of equivalents. But
this reply is unsatisfactory, for Wood agrees that Marx condemned wage-labor as intolerable coercion. The problem is that labor can be forced without
violating a reasonable standard of economic justice or the right of the worker
to a proper reward (and I take it that Wood is using the term "justice" in the
sense of economic justice, distribution of material goods). Further, Buchanan argues that Marx did not denounce capitalism as unjust from a standard
external to it, because such a standard does not pertain to communism. It is
precisely here that Buchanan's neglect of the intermediate socialist society as
an evaluative perspective becomes important. On his account it is unclear
why Marx speaks of theft and robbery in reference to exploitation, whereas
this is 'intelligible on the basis of the socialist principle of economic justice.
Marx's use of these words, of course, also poses a problem for Wood's thesis.
Another difficulty with Wood's thesis is discussed at length by H usami, who
claims that Wood has misinterpreted Marx's materialist conception of history. The correct interpretation is that the mode of production constitutes only
one level of determination of superstructural phenomena such as ideas on
politics, law, and morality; the other is the class structure. Within any mode
of production there are different moral outlooks corresponding to conflicting class-interests. H usami continues: "the rising class, as the harbinger of the
new society, embodies the future outlook, the outlook that will become
dominant; in its struggle with the declining class, it criticizes the declining
society in terms ... ofthe future society and its norms" (49, 50). Accordingly,
Husami reasons that it is consistent with the materialist conception of history
that the proletariat and its spokespersons criticize the bourgeois order in
terms of a socialist principle of justice. Thus far, Husami's analysis agrees
with (and further explicates) the viewpoint defended here; he proceeds to
argue, however, that normative criticisms are not merely consistent with this
conception of history but that Marx thought that they played an important
role in the proletariat's motivation to revolt. Moreover, Husami contends
that the passages cited in support of Wood's thesis are to be understood as
mere sociological observations.
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Revolutionary Motivation and Morality
It seems reasonable to suppose (as Husami does) that Marx meant his

indictment of capitalism, based on values such as freedom and justice, to
have the function of motivating the proletariat to rise against its oppressor
and inducing the moral conviction that the communist society ought to be
realized. Yet Marx denied throughout his writings that the appeal to values is
relevant for the class struggle. His attack on the "true socialists" in the
Communist Manifesto as well as his contention that the authors of the Gotha
Programme manifested a bourgeois preoccupation with economic justice
can serve here as examples or, alternatively, one might point to Marx's
famous statement in The German Ideology that "the communists do not
preach morality at all." Instead of morality, Marx saw a rather narrowly
circumscribed "material" self-interest as the core of the revolutionary motivation. Anthony Skillen in "Workers' Interest and the Proletarian Ethic:
Conflicting Strains in Marxian Anti-Moralism" (Marx and Morality), provides several reasons why this "egoistic utilitarianism" is a genuine strain in
Marx (158-160). Reformulating these clarifies why Marx rejects morality as
a motivating force: (1) Marx's theoretical framework, in which the material
(economic) base of society dominates, leaves little room for the "communicative" dimensions of social human life under which morality falls - a theme
familiar from the work of J iirgen Habermas. (2) Marx depicted capitalism as
a society penetrated by egoism, not only among the bourgeoisie, but also
among the oppressed. Moreover, he portrayed the worker as alienated from
his fellow workers and entangled in a desperate struggle for survival. Thus it
is an understatement to say that for Marx the proletarian's motivation for
revolution is self-interest - the interest is survival. (3) Marx often expressed
the belief that the capitalist economic order would collapse in virtue of its
own logic and contradictions: the falling rate of profit, recurrent economic
depressions and the growing misery of the proletariat. Within this "inevitable" process morality is superfluous as a motivating force. (4) Marx believed
that the interest of the proletariat coincides with the general interest of
mankind. He argued that the proletariat is characterized by "the total loss of
humanity and ... can therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity."5 It follows that morality is not needed in order to
transform the pursuit of self-interest into a pursuit that takes the interest of
humanity as its guideline.
Skillen points out that the Marxian idea that self-interest and general interest
coincide is implausible once it is admitted that the workers have more to lose
than their chains. More interesting, though, is Buchanan's criticism. He sets
out to show that "even if revolution is in the best interest of the proletariat,
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and even if every member of the proletariat realizes that this is so, so far as its
members act rationally, this class will not achieve concerted revolutionary
action" (88). This conclusion assumes that revolution is, for the proletariat, a
public good in the technical sense: its success will be beneficial to all workers,
even those who do not revolt. What treatens the pursuit of revolution is the
"free rider" problem. Each member of the proletariat, if rational, will reason
as follows: "Regardless of whether I engage in revolutionary action and pay
the price for doing so, either enough others will participate in the revolution
or they will not. If the former is the case, then I will enjoy the benefits of
revolutionary action and my contribution would be wasted. If the latter, my
contribution would be again a loss to me. So rational self-interest requires
that I do not engage in revolutionary action but go for a 'free ride' on the
efforts of the other workers." The revolution, then, will not occur when the
proletarians act as self-interested agents. Moreover, Buchanan observes that
the same result obtains when every member of the workers' class intends to
maximize the interest of his class, the reason being that the free rider
increases the group utility if enough workers participate in the revolution
and, if not enough workers participate, then the individual worker's contribution adds to the suffering of his class (90).
Buchanan argues that there are two types of strategies which might be used to
refute the public-goods objection (92). The first tries to solve the publicgoods problem, the second attempts to show that there is no such problem
for the proletariat. Buchanan argues against several hypothetical versions of
the second strategy. The first strategy can rely on any of the three generally
recognized types of solution to the public-goods problem: coercion, in-process benefits, and moral principles. The use of force can solve the free rider
problem because its use either creates a cost for the individual worker who
does not participate in revolutionary action or prevents those who have
refrained from action from enjoying the benefits. The history of the communist movement shows that this type of solution is a viable one, but there is no
textual evidence that Marx adhered to it. For Marx, the communist party
did not have a police function, but constituted the educational and tactical
elite of the workers' movement (Buchanan, 93). At some points, Marx seems
to have recognized the importance of in-process benefits. In the Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts, he said that "when communist workmen
gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc.; but at
the same time they acquire a new need ... and what appears as a means has
become an end ... company, association, conversation ... is enough for
them; the brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the
nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures." Skillen
argues that this passage makes clear that there is besides the "egoistic

132
utilitarian" strain in Marx another strain which formulates a "materialist
ethic," that is, morality as a way of life, rooted in the passions of the
proletariat (164-6). He counterposes this ethic to those moral systems in
which prescriptive rules are formulated with the purpose of redirecting
selfish desires toward actions in the interest of humanity. As a solution to the
public-goods problem, this "materialist ethic" is inadequate, for, first, the
intrinsic benefits of association are not always forthcoming and it is doubtful
that they are sufficient to counteract the costs of revolutionary activity, and,
second, it is far from obvious that in-process benefits explain how the
revolutionary process starts. Buchanan rightly notices that even if it is true
that in-process benefits are important to those who participate in the revolutionary struggle, the question is still what motivates its initiators. 6 The third
type of solution gives an adequate answer: moral principles that require one
to establish free andjust institutions. Adherence to such principles produces
cooperation in situations where none would be forthcoming if individuals
maximized their own interests or the interests of the group. Thus Buchanan
concludes (with good reason) that "Marx seems to have overlooked the
possibility that even where morality and interest seem to speak as with one
voice, morality may still have a function" (97). This function becomes even
more important once the "happy" coincidence ofthe requirements of morality (the interest of humanity) and self-interest is left behind in the realm of
dialectical myths.
Limitations and Implications

Marx unwittingly showed by way of his own work that the appeal to values
plays an important role in revolutionary motivation. The impact of Marx's
work would surely have been much less without its biting criticisms of the
moral shallowness of the life of the bourgeoisie, its solidarity with the
suffering ofthe proletariat and its vision ofthe communist society. However,
Marx's denial of the relevance of morality has left its traces behind as well.
Marxists have traditionally ignored the necessity of developing a socialist
value theory and a corresponding theory of moral obligation. It is a limitation of the literature reviewed here that this Marxian attitude has not been
traced back to Hegel.
Hegel's belief that the passions and selfish aims of "World-Historical Individuals" would bring about the aim of history (the consciousness offreedom
and its objectification in the modern state, such as the Prussian State) finds
its parallel in Marx's idea that self-interest is the core of revolutionary
motivation as well as in his idea that capitalists in the pursuit of their
self-interest would contribute to the collapse of the capitalist economic
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order. The Marxian version of Hegel's cunning of reason, then, is that
communism will inevitably emerge from the internal contradictions of capitalism. Both Hegel and Marx rejected morality as a powerless and irrelevant
protest against the existing state of affairs because they were convinced that
history was on their side and would lead to that which ought to be. It is from
this perspective, that history is the incarnation of reason (or "world spirit,"
Weltgeist), that Hegel's contention in the Philosophy of Right that "the
history of the world ... is the world's court of jUdgment" is to be understood.
The Marxian version of this is displayed in the passages cited in support of
Wood's thesis. Marx's remark that force will decide between the conflicting
rights of the worker and the capitalist reflects his conviction that history will
show whose rights will prevail and that any rights-claim is irrelevant and
ineffective in this respect. Marx believed that the "piece of good luck" of the
capitalist would be short-lived, for as he said elsewhere, "history is the judgeits executioner the proletarian."7 The failure to recognize this Hegelian
dimension in Marx causes Wood to infer that Marx viewed capitalism as
just. Hegel's influence on Marx is also exemplified by the latter's claim that
the ruthless British imperialism in India was to be welcomed, because
England would be the "unconscious tool of history," bringing about the
revolution in India. 8 Alternatively, this influence sheds light upon Marx's
contempt for those groups that were, so to speak, outside the dialectic, as well
as upon his admiration of capitalism which would draw "even the most
barbarian nations into civilisation" (Communist Manifesto). Marxists have
too seldom subjected these aspects of Marx to extensive criticism, and the
literature examined here does not constitute an exception.
The Hegelian elements in Marx help to explain some of the repulsive aspects
of Soviet Marxism such as its indifference to rights-claims and its repression
of cultural minorities. Moreover, they clarify the idea that the party line
represents the "objective truth." The party leadership grasps the intentions of
the Weltgeist and any moral protest against its course is senseless - historical
necessity leads to conformity. (Leszek Kolakowski perceptively spoke of the
"opiate of the Weltgeist.") But the Hegelian elements in Marx are offset by
Kantian elements. This is not the place to argue for this thesis in any detail,
but I will briefly sketch three similarities between the ideas of Kant and Marx
that make the thesis at least plausible.
Lucien Goldmann in his study on Kant's philosophy states that "Kant
succeeds in concentrating into a few words the most radical condemnation of
bourgeois society and in formulating the foundations of any future humanism: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at
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the same time as an end."'9 Negatively, this formulation of the categorical
imperative implies an indictment of capitalism similar to Marx's because
exploitation in its most general d~finition is using other persons as mere tools
for one's own benefit. Positively, it leads to Kant's vision ofthe moral society
as the aim of history in which autonomous persons will enhance each other's
ends. Here, similarities can be drawn to Marx's vision of the communist
society, although Kant held the more sensible position that the furtherance of
each other's ends must take place within a rights framework. (Marx's idea
that the communist society is beyond rights-principles is subjected to criticisms by Buchanan, 165 ff.) A third similarity concerns Kant's conception of
history. He developed the idea that the antagonisms between human beings
(caused by their "unsocial sociability") have the hidden purpose of bringing
about peace within and between states, which would be a first historical step
towards the moral society. But in contrast to Marx, this idea of the cunning
of nature never takes on a dogmatic (i.e., speculative and metaphysical)
character - Marx spoke of the "natural laws of capitalist production [that
work] with iron necessity towards inevitable results" (Capital I: 8) - but
rather is always meant to sp~r moral and political action towards the moral
society: it is a regulative idea. To what extent Marx's conception of history is
to be interpreted along these Kantian lines is debatable, but one might speak
here of a similarity because Marx in the practice of inquiry conveyed the
same message as Kant. Thus Marx's philosophy becomes one affirming the
primacy of praxis: history and nature must be interpreted in light of the
socialist (or communist) ideal and changed accordingly.
The similarities between Kant and Marx indicate that a synthesis of Marx's
social theory and morality is possible, provided that the Hegelian elements
are purged from his work while the Kantian elements are stressed and further
developed. This conclusion was already drawn in the beginning of this
century by the neo-Kantian socialist Hermann Cohen. His work stimulated
other neo-Kantian socialists, such as Karl VorUinder, to attempt to synthesize Kantian ethics and Marxism. Such a Kantianization of Marx also
requires, of course, that $ant's ethics be transformed in some respects. For
example, Kant paid too little attention to the historicity of human nature - a
problem that also characterizes most humanistic moral theories. A recent
promising attempt to come to a Kantianization of Marx is in the work of
Habermas. Yet Habermas fails to pay any serious attention to neo-Kantian
socialism and makes the all too common Marxist mistake of viewing Kant
through the eyes of Hegel (and Lukacs), with the result that Kant's ethics is
alleged to be an "empty formalism." It is time to look the opposite way, to see
Hegel and Marx through the eyes of Kant. 10
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